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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Article VIII, section
3 of the Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. 35-1-1 et seq. and 63-46b-l et seq. Peitioner
seeks relief from a Default Judgment entered against it on March 20, 1992. This is an appeal
from a final order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah issued by Administrative
Law Judge, Donald L. George, on the 19th day of October, 1992. Subsequently, Petitioner
timely filed its Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission.

An Order denying

Petitioner's Motion for Review was entered on the 6th day of January, 1993, by the Industrial
Commission. Neither Petitioner nor its counsel, the undersigned, received notification of the
Commission's Order denying Petitioner's Motion for Review. Therefore, Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on the 8th day of April, 1993. Such Motion for Reconsideration
was not acted upon in a timely manner by the Commission and, therefore, was deemed denied.
On the 2nd day of June, 1993, Petitioner filed a Writ of Review with the Utah Court of Appeals.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

Do the actions of Petitioner, giving rise to the entry of Default Judgment against it,
constitute excusable neglect, mistake and in part because of misrepresentation by
Applicant, such that equity requires the Default Judgment be set aside?

II.

Was there sufficient evidence before the Industrial Commission in order to arrive at its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law? Was the award granted by the Industrial
Commission reasonable based on the evidence before it?
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Proceeding. This is an appeal from the decision of the Industrial Commission
rendered by Administrative Law Judge, Donald L. George, on October 19, 1992, (Case
No. 91-1181) wherein Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered.
Previsouly a Default Judgment had been entered against the Petitioner, Pipe Specialty,
Inc., on or about March 20, 1992. Subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
found that the Applicant, Salvador D. Montoya, was injured while working for
Petitioner. The medical bills for the treatment rendered to Applicant included $432.25
to the Bannock Regional Medical Center in Pocatello, Idaho, and $503.00 to Dr. Davis,
a physician in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Further, it was determined that the Applicant
was working an average of 55 hours per week and earning in excess of $11 per hour,
being married and supporting a dependant child. Further, the Applicant was deemed
temporarily totally disabled from the date of the accident, October 2, 1991, through and
including January 3, 1992. Therefore, Applicant was awarded $5,706.01 for the
temporary total disability. Further, Petitioner was ordered to pay the attorney's fees of
the Uninsured Employers Fund for an additional amount of $520.00. Such judgment
amounts include interest at 8 percent per annum beginning January 3, 1992.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Annotated. (1953 as amended) Section 35-1-1 et seq.
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Utah Code Annotated. (1953 as amended) Section 63-46(b)-l et seq.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b).
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about October 1, 1991, while in the employ of Pipe Specialty, Inc., Applicant,
Salvador D. Montoya, allegedly suffered an industrial accident wherein a small bone in the great
left toe was fractured. The accident occurred at the work site of Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, at
or near Pocatello, Idaho. The Applicant incurred emergency medical expenses in the amount
of $432.25 from the care provided at the Bannock Regional Medical Center at or near Pocatello,
Idaho. Subsequently, Applicant incurred medical expenses from a physician in Las Cruces, New
Mexico, of $503.00. The alleged accident of the Applicant occurred as the Petitioner was
completing its job in the Pocatello, Idaho, area. Subsequently, Petitioner's work was sporadic
throughout the remainder of 1991 and 1992. Though Applicant was temporarily disabled
because of the accident, Petitioner was unable to employ him or other employees during the
entire period of Applicant's temporary disablement.
Shortly after the accident, on or about October 22, Applicant filed a Petition for Hearing
seeking workers compensation benefits to be paid by Petitioner. Sometime in 1992, it was
communicated to Petitioner by the Applicant that Applicant no longer wished to pursue any
claim against Petitioner for workers compensation benefits. In the first part of 1992, Petitioner
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continued to employ the Applicant in its various work projects throughout Utah and New
Mexico.
Because of the numerous representations made by Applicant to Petitioner, Petitioner did
not respond to Applicant's Application ana ^id not advise counsel of any pending administrative
action. On or about March 20, 1992, unbeknownst to Petitioner a Default was entered against
Petitioner for failing to timely respond to the Application of the Applicant for workers
compensation benefits. Plaintiff did not receive any Notice of such Default. The subsequ it
Notice that Petitioner received from the Industrial Commission was that of a Notice of
Cancellation of the Hearing sought by Applicant. Such Notice of Cancellation was dated April
2, 1992.
Other than the initial Application for workers compensation benefits, Petitioner, Pipe
Specialty, never received any Notice or communication from the Industrial Commission.
Concurrently, Petitioner was involved in another matter pending before the Industrial
Commission and was represented by counsel. After Petitioner's Default was entered, a hearing
was held (on October 15, 1992) wherein the merits of the Applicant's claims were considered.
The Industrial Commission, based on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered into by
Administrative Law Judge Donald L. George, ordered that Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, pay to the
Applicant any and all medical expenses, in excess of $935.00, together with unpaid temporary
total compensation in the amount of $5,706, together with interest accruing at a rate of 8 percent
per annum. Thereafter, the award entered against Petitioner was augmented in an amount of
$520.00 for attorney's fees incurred by the Uninsured Employers Fund, having appeared through
its counsel, Thomas C. Sturdy.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner, Pipe Specialty, Inc., should be entitled to the equitable relief of having the
Default Judgment against it set aside. Petitioner was led to believe by the Applicant that the
Application for workers compensation benefits for the accident that occurred on or about
October 1, 1991, was no longer being pursued by Applicant. Though Petitioner did receive the
initial Application for such benefits, it received no other additional notices or communication
from the Industrial Commission concerning any pending action, including hearings regarding the
merits of Applicant's claims.
Further, Petitioner's neglect is further excused and its arguments for equitable relief
strengthened by its receipt of a Notice of Cancellation of Hearing from the Commission.
Because the Applicant misled Petitioner into believing that the Application for workers
compensation benefits was withdrawn, he caused the Petitioner to be taken off notice of any
pending administrative action. Further, Petition continued to employ Applicant through and
including the first part of 1992 in the location of Applicant's home town, Las Cruces, New
Mexico.
Notwithstanding the valid arguments by Petitioner in seeking a review on the merits, the
Industrial Commission conducted a hearing via telephone wherein it arrived at the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law which were not supported by a sufficient factual record.
Specifically, the Commission relied on hearsay testimony as to the number of hours worked on
the average by Applicant (being in excess of 55 hours per week). Such finding constituted the
majority of the judgment award against Petitioner.

5

ARGUMENT
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Factual Determinations Must Be Supported by the Evidence

As with Reviews of other Administrative Agencies, this court gives deference to facts
determined by the Agency at the hearing level if they are supported by the evidence. Where
they are not supported, no such deference is given. In Hurst v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission. 723 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court described this
deference. "On questions of fact, the Commission's Findings are conclusive and not subject to
review by this court unless they are without substantial support in the record and thus clearly
arbitrary and capricious." The Findings of the Agency are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. "The Findings are clearly erroneous only if they are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the Appellat Court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made." State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Further, the Findings of
Fact must be supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court. See Grace Drilling Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah 1989).
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POINT I
BECAUSE OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND MISREPRESENTATION,
EQUITY JUSTIFIES PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR RELIEF FROM THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST IT,
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court to relieve a party
from a judgment for reasons including but not limited to: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect; ... (3) fraud, whether heretofore denominated, intrinsic or extrinsic,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... or (7) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
As is apparent from the above facts and substantiated by the Affidavit of Petitioner's
President, Mr. Ron Bingham, Petitioner's actions rise to the level of excusable neglect and that
Petitioner has been a victim of misrepresentation by Applicant.
The position of the Utah Supreme Court on Rule 60(b) motions is clearly anti-default.
In the case of Helgesen v. Inyangumia. 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981), the court reversed the
district court's denial to set aside a Default Judgment stating:
The decision to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is
subject to discretion of the trial court. But discretion should be exercised in
furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful
case to the end that the party may have a hearing. We reiterated in May hew v.
Standard Gilsonite Co.. 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962) that it is quite uniformly
regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a Default Judgment
where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the Defendant's failure to
appear, and timely application is made to set it aside. 336 P.2d 1081 (emphasis
added).
The alleged industrial accident incurred on or about October 1, 1991, Petitioner's work
in the Pocatello, Idaho, area was nearly completed when the accident occurred. On or about
October 22, 1992, the Applicant after returning to Salt Lake Cit after completion of the job in
7

Pocatello, filed for workers compensation benefits with the Industrial Commission. During the
remaining time of 1991, Petitioner had little or no work in which to provide its employees.
Shortly before Christmas, Applicant returned to his home in Las Cruces, New MeAico, where
for the first time subsequent to the initial health care treatment provided at the Bannock Regional
Medical Center in Pocatello, Idaho, Applicant sought the medical assistance of Dr. Alan Davis.
(See Affidavit of Petitioner's President, Ron Bingham, at page £

.)

Shortly after the first consultation with the Applicant, Dr. Davis allowed for and certified
Applicant able to return to work. However, in the first part of 1992 the work of Petitioner was
sporadic. In January 1992, once Petitioner had procurred work for its employees, Applicant
communicated to Petitioner that he was withdrawing his Application for workers compensation
benefits and wished to drop the entire matter. (See Affidavit of Bingham at page

Qj .)

However, the record created by the Industrial Commission at its October 10, 1992, hearing,
wherein Petitioner was not present nor represented, assumes that Applicant returned home
immediately after the accident to receive continued treatment from Dr. Alan C. Davis. In
reality, Dr. Davis had very few consultation periods with the Applicant and failed to even
provide a impairment rating based on the alleged injury of Applicant.
Petitioner, during the first part of 1992, was involved in other pending administrative
action before the Industrial Commission. However, because of the communications from
Applicant to Petitioner and the reliance of Petitioner on such communications, no appearance
of counsel was entered nor was any responsive pleading filed with the Industrial Commission.
Having received no additional notification of any pending action, Petitioner assumed that the
communication received by Applicant was accurate and correct.
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Such understanding wv.s

substantiated by Petitioner's receipt of a Notice of Cancellation of a Hearing dated April 2,
1992. Shortly before that Notice was received unbeknownst to Petitioner, its Deault was entered
on or about March 20, 1992, for having failed to respond to the Application of the Applicant
within the time required under the rules of the Industrial Commission.
It is patently unfair and prejudicial to Petitioner to not have the opportunity to fully
respond to the allegations set forth in Applicant's Application and to have a full and complete
hearing on the merits of such Application.

Because of misrepresentation by Applicant to

Petitioner and the receipt, coincidentally, of a Notice of a Cancelled Hearing received by
Petitioner, Petitioner's failure to timely respond constitutes mistake, inadvertence, and/or
excusable neglect. Equity demands that Petitioner be entitled to respond fully to the Applicant's
Application and to have the Default Judgment entered against Petitioner set aside. Further,
Petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the merits.

POINT H
THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WAS HEARSAY AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
Because Petitioner was unaware of any hearing and any pending administrative action,
a Default Judgment was entered against Petitioner. Petitioner was not present at the October 10,
1992, hearing wherein evidence was gathered and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were entered by the Administrative Law Judge. The majority of the evidence taken and, as
reflected in the transcript, was done so via telephone without the Applicant having been sworn
to the testimony that was provided (Tr. 9 L. 14).
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Further, Applicant did not submit any records to substantiate the claims of weekly work
averages in excess of 55 hours. To the contrary, the records of Petitioner support a much lower
weekly average, or approximately 23-30 hours per week.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner is entitled to the equitable relief it seeks, namely a
setting aside of the Default Judgment and an opportunity to be heard at a hearing. Further, the
Findings of the Industrial Commission are erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence
presented. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to have the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order of the Administrative Law Judge set aside or modified.

Respectfully submitted this *3Q—day of January, 1994.

l^J^HAo

O&.J

JAI^SjTLWp7
^
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed or hand delivered, forfr true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner to the attorneys and parties at the addresses listed below, on
the X)M- day of January, 1994.

SALVADOR D. MONTOYA
4362 Highway 28 South
Las Cruces, NM 84065
SHARON J. EBLEN, ESQ.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

JA^ES J. LUKfo,
Attorney for Petitioner
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ADDENDA

JAMES J. LUND
2304 S. Berkeley Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Telephone: (801) 466-2210
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
AFFIDAVIT of RON BINGHAM,
President of Petitioner,
Pipe Specialty, Inc.

Petitioner,

-vs.-

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH and
SALVADOR MONTOYA,

Case No. 930353-CA

Respondents

County of

J^f/2fc^z^e-

State of

//{J%^7

The Affiant sayeth:
1.

I am President of Pipe Specialty, Inc., a Utah corporation, and have been
since its inception.

2.

I am familiar with the day-to-day operations concerning Pipe Specialty.

3.

On or about October 1, 1991, I was directing a crew of workers in and around
the Pocatello, Idaho, area.

1

4.

During that time, it is alleged that the Applicant, Salvador D. Montoya,
injured his large left toe while working.

5.

Applicant was directed to receive treatment at the Bannock Regional Medical
Center in Pocatello, Idaho. At that point, we were nearly finished with the job
there in Idaho.

6.

Our crews returned to Salt Lake City towards the middle of October 1991, and
we had ittle if no work the remaining portion of 1991. In 1992, our work
was sporadic, but in a greater volume than the last part of 1991. I was aware
that Applicant had filed an Application with the Industrial Commission seeking
workers compensation benefits for the injury he sustained October 1, 1991.

7.

On several occasions in the beginning part of the year 1992, Applicant
indicated and communicated to me that he no longer wished to pursue the
workers compensation claims with the Industrial Commission against Pipe
Specialty.

8.

Applicant continued to work on the crews that we had in the state of Utah and
including the state of New Mexico.

9.

The number of hours worked by Applicant in 1991 did not average 55 hours
per week. There may have been a few weeks in which such number of hours
were worked; however, the average was approximately 25-30 at most.

10.

In addition to Applicant communicating to me that he no longer wished to
pursue his claims for workers compensation benefits, our office was in receipt
of a Notice of a Cancelled Hearing which further led me to believe that there
was no pending administrative action at the Industrial Commission.

11.

Because of the foregoing, I did not communicate any information concerning
any pending action to legal counsel who was and currently is representing Pipe
Specialty in various matters, including those before the Industrial Commission.

DATED this £ /

day of February, 1994.

Affiant, Ron Bingham,
President of Pipe Specialty, Inc.
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JURAT
day of February, 1994, and did swear
Ron Bingham appeared before me on the
to me that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the foregoing is true and
accurate.
DATED THIS 9J

day of February, 1994.
NOTARY PUBLIC

CAROL GOLLINC^

I
I
I
J

5480 South 4420 West
Kearns, Utah$4«,i8
My CcKnrrussion Expims 1/7/M
STATF OF UTAH

Notary Public

Residing at:
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 91-1181
SALVADOR D- MONTOYA,

*
*
*
*
*

BINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

PIPE SPECIALTIES, INC.

*

Judge Doriald L. George

(uninsured) .

*

Applicant,
vs.

Defendant.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Donald
L. George, one of the Administrative Law Judges of the Industrial
Commission of Utah on October 15, 1992 on the application of
Salvador Montoya for an award of temporary total compensation and
payment of medical expenses incurred as the result of an industrial accident. The applicant was present by telephone from his
home in New Mexico. The default of the defendant, Pipe Specialties, Inc., was issued on March 20, 1992 for failure to respond
to the application within the time required by the rules of the
Industrial Commission of Utah. The Uninsured Employers' Fund
appeared through its counsel, Thomas C. Sturdy. The applicant
testified on his behalf and the medical records pertinent to Mr.
Montoya's injuries were admitted in evidence. Based upon that
testimony and evidence, the Industrial Commission of Utah now
makes the following:
/V
FINDINGS OF FACT
On October 1, 1991, while pursuing the business of his
employer, defendant Pipe Specialties, Iiic., a Utah corporation,
the applicant suffered an industrial accident when a jig holding
a large section of pipe broke and dropped the pipe on Mr.
Montoya's foot, fracturing the proximal phalanx of the left great
toe. The accident: occurred near Pocate.lio, Idaho. Mr* Montoya
had worked for Pipe Specialties within Vhe State of Utah within
the previous six months.
The Bannock Memorial Medical Cent'-*-, Pocatello, Idaho, and
Alan C. Davis, M.D., Las Cruces, New M ;;ic:o, treated Mr.
MonLoya's injury. The medical bills are: $432.25 owirrf to the
Bannock Regional Medical Center and $503.00 owing to Dr. Davis.
At the tima of the accident, Mr. Kontcya was working an
average of 55 hours per week and earning^JUxui_pi?x_Jlour. He was
married and had one child who was dependent on him for support.
Mr. Montoya was totally disabled from the q a v of the acci-

dent until Dr. Davis released him to return to work on January 3,
1992.
Pipe Specialties, Inc. had no workeir's compensation insurance at the time of Mr. Montoya's accident.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident on
October 1, 1992, while employed by defendant Pj.pe Specialties,
Inc., when a large section of pipe dropped on his foot and
fractured the proximal phalanx of the left great toe.
The defendant is liable for Applicant's mediical expenses
reasonably related to the industrial injury.
The applicant is entitled to temporary2total^isabi 1 ity
compensation benefits for the period from October 2] 1991 to
January'3, 1992 when he was released to return to work by his
treating physician.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pipe Specialties, Inc. shall pay
all medical expenses incurred by the applicant <\s the result of
the industrial accident including, but not limited to, $432.25
owing to the Bannock Regional Medical Center, and $503.00 owing
to Dr. Alan C. Davis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Pipe Specialties, Inc.,
pay to Salvador Montoya temporary total compensation at the rate
of $378.00 per week for 13.4286 weeks for a total of $5,706.01
for temporary total disability from October 2, 1991 through
January 3, 1992. These benefits are accrued and shall be paid in
a lump sum with interest of 8% per annum commencing January 3,
1992.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant shall be entitled
to recover all attorneys fees and costs incurred in collecting
this award from Pipe Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-59.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Pipe Specialties, Inc.,
becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or
other security to pay the amounts required to be paid by this
Order, the compensation and benefits shall be paid by the Uninsured Employers' Fund in accordance with the Medical and Surgical
Fee Schedule of the Commission. In the event of payment by the
Uninsured Employers' Fund, it shall be subrogated to all of the
rights of the applicant to collect the sums due and owing by Pipe
Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-107.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of

the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
not subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
/ Y ^ C IA. si.V

Obi*

^

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/f&ts

day of October, 1992.

ATTEST:

P a t r i c i a O. Ash
C o m m i s s i o n S e c re t r a r y

Ul/04/89
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
Case Nvsaber 91O011&1
Salvador D* Montoya,

*
•

Applicant,
vs.

*
*

Pipe Specialties, Inc.
(uninsured),

*
*

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR
REVIEW

*

Respondent.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("commission11) issues this
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section
63-46b-12.
On November 19, 1992, Pipe Specialties, Inc. ("respondent11)
timely filed a motion for review of the Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order entered by an administrative law judge
("ALJ") of the commission in the above captioned matter on October
19, 1992.
The respondent requests that the commission grant a hearing
and review the merits of the applicant's claim. The respondent's
request is based upon its claim that it received no notice of the
pending action following the Notice of Cancellation of Hearing
dated April 2, 1992.
Review of the record in this matter shows that the respondent
received notice of the following: (1) Application for Hearing by
certified letter dated January 30, 1992; (2) Notice of Hearing
dated March 19, 1992; (3) Default Order for failure of respondents
to file an answer to the application for hearing dated March 20,
1992; (4) Interrogatories to Applicant dated March 31, 1992; (5)
Notice of Cancellation of Hearing dated April 2, 1992; (6) Notice
of Hearing on October 16, 1992 dated July 20, 1*92; (7) Findings of
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 19, 1992; (8)
Abstract of Award dated October 19, 1992; (9) Supplemental Order
Awarding Attorneys Fees dated November 4, 1992; and (10) Abstract
of Award dated November 4, 1392*
The file contains no notice that Mr. Lund was representing the
respondent in this matter. All notices described above were mailed
to the respondent at its address in Riverton, Utah and none were
returned. It is unreasonable for the respondent to assert that
notice should have been sent to his attorney when no no' Lee of
representation had been filed with the commission. We believe that
the respondent had ample notice and opportunity to appear or file
pleadings in this matter.
The respondent further claims that the applicant made
representations that he no longer wished to pursue his claim

01/04/89

01:53

8012544493

P.S.I.
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Salvador D. Montoya
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Page two
against the respondent and that
caused the respondent not to file
a hearing. It appears, then that
articulate an estoppel argument
hearing.

the applicant's representation
*n answer to the application for
^he respondent is attempting to
in support of granting a new

A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or
acts if they are contrary to his own knowledge of the truth or if
he had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could
ascertain the true situation* Coombs v. Ouzounian. 24 Utah 2d 39 t
465 P.2d 356 (1970); see also Cook v. Cook. 110 Utah 406, 174 P.2d
434 (lftAfi)* Furthermore/ a determination of the issue of_estoppel
is not dependent on the subjective state of mind of the person
claiming he was misled, but rather is to be based on an objective
test, i.e., what would a reasonable person conclude under the
circumstances. BjJg__J3utte Ranch, Inc.....v.. Holm, Utah, 570 P.2d 690
(1977); Corporation Nine v. Tavlor. 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417
(1973).
The Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to
provide equitable remedies1, however, even if we had such
authority we would not find in favor of respondent under these
circumstances. Applying a reasonable person standard, we find that
a new heai Ing is not warranted in this case.
The respondent
received notice of all pleadings and hearings in this matter and
chose to ignora them in deference to the alleged misrepresentations
of the applic -t. We believe that a reasonable person would make
further inquii^ with the commission or his attorney if ?1^ received
net ices regarding a_„jaatter _j\e_ believed had been resolved.
T refore,
the
respondent's
reliance
on
the "alleged
misrepresentations of the applicant was unreasonable.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law
judge dated November 19, 1992 Is hereby affirmed.

1

M

[T]he Industrial Commission remains a statutorily-created
ager* y, not a court of equity, is such, the Industrial Commission
has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
7&
p 2d
legislature." BayHjs.Vju IndttaAciU^JBfl^
573, 576
(1990); Utah Qonp.j Co. \ . J M w t y i * ! COB&S*I, 57 Ut^ah 118, VJZ P*
24, 26 (1920).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the
Utah Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the Order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86,
and 63-46b-16, and Bonded Bicvcle Couriers v. Dent, of Employment
Security. Case No. 920621-CA (Utah Ct- App. Dec* 4, 1992). The
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of
the hearing for appeals purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Commissioner
Certified this /Sz£ day of
AT
Patricia 0* A s h b y / /
Commission Secretary tjh
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the / ^ d a v of January, 1993, the
attached ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Salvador
Montoya was nailed, postage pre-paid to the following persons at
the following addresses:
Salvador Montoya
4 362 Highway 28 So
Las Cruces, NM 84065
ipipBiiiSl^ffi^ltl'^

I no

4425 W 12600 5
Riverton UT 84065
Joyce Sewell, Administrator
UEF
Thomas C. Sturdy, Atty
UEF
Judge Donald L. George

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

S. Harrison, Paralegal
judication Division
/jsh
Cert\Montoya
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James J. Lund 5751
Attorney for Defendant
10 West 100 South #710
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 575-8311
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Salvador D. Montoya
Applicant

Pipe Specialties, Inc.,
Defendant

MOTION FOR REVIEW

Judge Donald George

Defendant moves the Commission, pursuant to Commission Rules and Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-82.52 (1988 Repl. Vol
) to review its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order entered on the 19th day of October 1992. The basis for Defendant's
motion for Review is as follows:
1.

Applicant is currently and has been in the employ of Defendant subsequent
to the alleged accident date.

2.

While in the employ of Defendant, Applicant told Defendant he no longer
wished to pursue a claim against Defendant.

3.

Based on such representations, Defendant did not respond, to Claimant's
Application, by filing on answer.

4.

Further, Defendant received Notice of Cancellation of Hearing from the
Commission dated April 2, 1992.

5.

Thereafter, Defendant received no further notice from either the Commission
or Applicant that any action was still pending against it.

6.

Under such understanding Defendant did not apprise the undersigned of any
action pending.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH
Page Two
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7.

The undersigned has been active in representing Defendant in various legal
matters including a separate matter before the Commission involving Mr.
Lester Hunt as applicant.

8.

As counsel for Defendant the undersigned has never received any notice
concerning Applicant's application.

Based on the foregoing Defendant seeks a Hearing and Review on the merits of Applicant's
Application and a reasonable and fair opportunity to consider the evidence put forth by
AppUcant in Support of the award entered by way at Order by the Commission on October
19, 1992.

DATED this 19th day of November, 1992

OJ.

II

x
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 91-1181
SALVADOR D. MONTOYA,
Applicant,

*
*
*

ABSTRACT OF AWARD

*

vs.

*
*

PIPE SPECIALTIES, INC.
(uninsured).

*
*

Judge Donald L. George

*

Defendant.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

I hereby certify that on the // *~day of October, 1992, the
Industrial Commission of Utah made and issued an award in the
above entitled cause in favor of the applicant, Salvador D.
Montoya, and against defendant Pipe Specialties, Inc., in the
above entitled matter. The award was:
The amount of $ $5,706.01, together with interest at
the rate of 8% per annum from January 3, 1992, together
with $935.25 for medical expenses, and all attorneys
fees and costs incurred in collecting these sums from
Pipe Specialties, Inc., purusant to UCA §35-1-59.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and the seal
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, thi.s '9^day of October,

A

/v

c.{>
, .^ \^L^V2

£f.

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Uj:ah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/9c/Jday
of October, 1992.
ATTEST:

%?*~J
**d±

O

Patricia O. Ashb
Commission Secrelb&xy

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the /^^ciay ot
/ •C Jr ; ^ < ^ ^ , 1992, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Salvador D. Montoya
43 62 Highway 28 South
Las Cruces, NM 84065
Pipe Specialties, Inc.
4425 West 12600 South
Riverton, UT 84 065
Joyce A. Sewell, Administrator
Uninsured Employers' Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
Thomas C. Sturdy
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
INDUSTRIAL. COMMISSION OF UTAH

^

.

^

June Harrison, Paralegal
Adjudication Division

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING*
I certify that on the /4^' day of / / r y c L- ^ , 1992, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the *!otegoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Salvador D. Montoya
43 62 Highway 28 South
Las Cruces, NM 84065
Pipe Specialties, Inc.
4425 West 12600 South
Riverton, UT 84 065
Joyce A. Sewell, Administrator
Uninsured Employers' Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
Thomas C. Sturdy
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
INDUSTRIA?u COMMISSION OF UTAH
/

June Harrisbn, Para"egal */
Adjudication Division
\

James J. Lund (#5751)
Attorney for Petitioner^
Crandall Building, Suite 710
10 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 575-8311

Utah cot.

jcuot

r f

^

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CierKOiU ib Court
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC,
Petitioner,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
Respondent

Case No. 91-1181

Court of Appeals No..

Petitioner petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for a Writ of Review of the decision of
the Adjudication Division of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Case No. 91-1181
in the case entitled Salvador D. Montoya v. Pipe Specialty, Inc., which decision became final May
3, 1993. This petition seeks respondent to certify the entire record, which shall include all of the
proceedings and evidence taken in this matter, to the court. This petition seeks review of the
entire decision.
Dated this 6th day of June 1993.

James J. Lund
'y
Attorney for Petitioner
Pipe Specialty, Inc.

MAILING CERTIFIED
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW to the following on this 3rd day of June,
1993:
Mr^Benjfimin Sims. General Counsel
Incfustriaf Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Utah Attorney General's Office
230 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Salvador D. Montoya
4362 Highway 28 South
Las Cruces, NM 84065
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COPY
JAMES J. LUND #5751
Suite 710 Crandall Building
10 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone: (801) 575-8311
Facsimile: (801) 575-8340
Attorney for Defendant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ABJUDICATION DIVISION

SALVADOR MONTOYA, an individual, :
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff
v.

:
Case No.

PIPE SPECIALTY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.
Defendant, Pipe Specialty, by and through its counsel, James
J, Lund, hereby moves the Division to reconsider the Division's
Order denying review previously sought by Defendant's Motion for
Review.

The basis for this Motion for Reconsideration is as

follows:
1. By Defendant's previously filed Motion for Review on or about
fJpveA^lpor

(*/

of 1992, the Division was apprised of the

undersigned's representation of Defendant.

1

2. The Division, through denying Defendant's Motion for Review,
failed to give notice to the undersigned because it omitted
the undersigned1s name and address to the mailing or service
certificate

that

accompanied

Qa*>\uo+~«/ (f /?9%
3. In

subsequent

the

Division's

Order

dated

denying the Defendant's Motion for Review.
communication

with

General

Counsel

for

the

Industrial Commission, in March of 1993 the undersigned had
confirmed to him the fact that improper or inadequate notice
of the Division's Order denying the Defendant's Motion for
Review had been given.
4. Because of the inadequate and/or improper and untimely notice
Defendant's appeal rights from the Division's Order denying
the Defendant's Motion for Review were obviated.
5. The appeal time frame began running from the date of the
Division's Order or

^jZin^^y

/ff}

/

6. Defendant and its officers, being out of town on work was not
apprised of the Division's Order denying Defendant's Motion
for

Review

and

therefore

could

not

timely

notify

the

undersigned of any action by the Division.
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant, by and through the
counsel of record, James J. Lund, hereby respectfully submits
this Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this

£—

day of April, 1993.

&*~*^

es J. Lu£ja
Attorney for Defendant

2

